Abstract Coordinated mission decision-making is one of the core steps to effectively exploit the capabilities of cooperative attack of multiple aircrafts. However, the situational assessment is an essential base to realize the mission decision-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a mission decision-making method of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on situational assessment. We have studied the situational assessment mathematical model based on the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) evidence theory and the mission decision-making mathematical model based on the game theory. The proposed mission decision-making method of antagonized airfight is validated by some simulation examples of a swarm of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) that carry out the mission of the suppressing of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
Introduction
The team of multiple aircrafts has stronger capability than a single aircraft in detecting the targets, piercing through the defense systems, and carrying out the attack mission. Each member of the team can share the information acquired by any other one and carry out mission of cooperative attacking targets according to its position in air and the resources of fighting for a uniform airfight intention. The team of multiple aircrafts is able to form easily all kinds of vertiginous attack situation in airfight so that those opposed targets will be confronted with the defending difficulties. Thereby, the fashion that multiple aircrafts cooperatively attack targets will be the main pattern in future airfight.
In this paper, the phrase of attacking effect consists of validity, invalidity and uncertainty. The validity and invalidity of attacking effect are defined as the advantage acquired by our aircrafts (or foe's targets) and the cost paid for achieving intention by our aircrafts (or foe's targets) in antagonized airfight, respectively. Sensors aboard aircraft affect the attacking effect of aircraft due to the capability of sensors in detecting, tracking and identifying target, while weapons aboard aircraft affect the attacking effect due to the capability of weapons in hitting and destroying target. However, the above capabilities of sensors and weapons all rest with the distance, azimuth and pitching between one of our aircrafts and one of foe's targets. Accordingly, the fuzzy mapping function of the fighting effect of sensor and weapon is constructed by selecting the three position parameters of distance, azimuth and pitching as variables for establishing the correspondence between the position parameter and the ability of sensor and weapon. In this paper, the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) synthesize rules are used for formulating the situational assessment method.
When multiple aircrafts in our team are antagonizing some foe's targets simultaneously, one of our aircrafts is able to either detect and identify the foe's targets by sensors aboard the aircraft or receive the information of the foe's targets by wireless data link. Therefore, in this paper, we suppose that our team of multiple aircrafts has known the position and identity of all foe's targets and is able to acquire the important reasoning from the position and identity of foe's target to the capability of sensors' detecting and weapons' attack, the defending strategies and the advantage (showed by numerical value) acquired by selecting a certain defending strategy. If the above situation of antagonizing airfight is analyzed by quoting the game theory model, the situation means that our team has known the opponents and the opponents' strategies and cost function. Considering that our opponent is powerful, we think that our opponent also has known the equivalent information about our team of multiple aircrafts at least. We suppose that our team and our opponent simultaneously carry out action for equality because they all try to be the first actor. In this paper, the static non-cooperative and nonzero Nash games are used for formulating the mission decision-making method.
In recent years, a significant shift of focus has occurred in the field of autonomous unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UAVs) as researchers began to investigate problems involving multiple UAVs rather than single UAV. As a result of this focus on multiple UAVs, coordination of multiple UAVs has received significant attention. [1] [2] [3] Moreover, cooperative systems are required to operate in an adversary environment (such as suppressing of enemy air defenses (SEAD)). 4, 5 Cooperative decision-making for multi-UAV or multi-Agent system is of great interest. A significant amount of current research activities focuses on a theoretic control framework for distributed cooperative decision-making for an ensemble of UAVs, and all the used research methods in this field are similar in Refs. [6] [7] [8] Additional autonomous decision-making focusing on mission planning, target assignment, or operation management of complex system can be found in Refs. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] Solutions to general UAV cooperative decision-making problems in adversarial environments can be obtained by solving game problems introduced and implemented in Refs. [15] [16] [17] Related application information of game theory method appears in many sources. 18, 19 A synthetic method for situation assessment based on fuzzy logic and D-S evidence theory is proposed in Refs. 20, 21 This paper develops a mission decision-making algorithm based on the game model, and then proposes a situational assessment algorithm based on the D-S evidence synthesize rules for a swarm of UCAVs in SEAD mission. In Section 2, a situational assessment algorithm of coordinated airfight is presented in detail and the D-S evidence theory is introduced simply for sustaining the mentioned situational assessment algorithm above. In Section 3, a mission decision-making algorithm is designed by formulating the strategies and cost function in the game model. Section 3 is based on Section 2. Section 4 shows an simulation example of a typical mission performed by a swarm of UCAVs. In Section 5, the simulating results in Section 4 are analyzed deeply. Section 6 summarizes the conclusions.
2. Formulating situational assessment based on evidence theory
Preliminaries
For sustaining the situational assessment algorithms mentioned in the previous section, the basic concepts of the D-S evidence theory are first introduced in the following part.
Let H be a set consisting of all the values that X might be and an element of set H is not consistent with the other elements, and then H is called as the discernment frame of X. Definition 1. Let H be a frame of discernment, and if the function m : 2 H ! ½0; 1 fulfills the following conditions:
then m is called as the basic probability assignment on the frame of discernment H and mðAÞ is called as the basic probability number of A. mðAÞ denotes the believed degree of A oneself. where BelðAÞ denotes the believed degree of A including all of its subsets. D-S synthesize rules. Let Bel 1 ; Bel 2 ; Á Á Á ; Bel n be the belief functions on the same frame of discernment H; m 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n are the basic probability assignments correspondingly. If Bel 1 È Bel 2 È . . . È Bel n is existent and has the basic probability assignment m, then
where K is the middle parameter, and A 1 , A 2 , . . ., A n are subsets of the discernment frame element A. The D-S synthesize rules reflect the effect of combined operations made by many evidences.
Situational assessment algorithm of coordinated airfight
For achieving the situational assessment of multi-aircraft cooperative attack, the relevant mathematical model is established based on the D-S evidence theory as follows.
Firstly, we establish the discernment frame of the fighting effect H.
Let H ¼ fa; b; hg be the discernment frame of fighting effect defined in Section 1, where a; b and h denote respectively the fighting efficacy, inefficacy and uncertainty in the three cases of single aircraft attack versus one enemy target, multiaircraft cooperative attack versus one enemy target, and multi-aircraft cooperative attack versus multiple enemy targets.
Secondly, design the basic probability assignment on the frame of discernment H for our aircraft.
The basic probability assignment of the sensor distance evidence is formulated in the expression Eqs. (1)- (3), which is depicted in Fig. 1 . 
where -RL is the basic probability assignment of the sensor distance (radar length r) evidence, where -denotes that the function is used for describing aircraft (we also define the function # for describing enemy target correspondingly). The functions formulated in the expression Eqs. (1)- (3) are actually the fuzzy mapping functions of the fighting effect of the sensor distance evidence, which establishes the correspondence between the distance from the aircraft to foe's target and the sensor detecting ability of our aircraft. In the expression Eqs. (1)- (3), the other mathematical symbols are depicted in Fig. 1 .
As shown in Fig. 1 , the unitary fighting effect value of the synthesis capability (-RL ðÁÞ, the vertical axis of the coordinates, in ½0; 1 without unit) is achieved in the process of sensors when the aircraft detects, tracks and identifies foe's target. It depends on the distance (r, the horizontal axis of the coordinates, with a unit of kilometer) between the aircraft and foe's target. -RL ðÁÞ implies how much the sensors' ability being enslaved to the distance contributes to the whole attacking action. In Fig. 1 , the cures with sign (a; b and h) represent the validity, invalidity and uncertainty of the fighting effect of the sensor distance evidence, respectively; the values of the vertical axis parameters (a zo ; a js ; a zj ; a ks ; a zb ; b zo ; b js ; b zj ; b ks ; b zb ) and the horizontal axis parameters (l zo ; l js ; l zj ; l ks ; l zb ) will be embodied by the capability of the actual sensors.
Analogously, the basic probability assignments of sensor pitching evidence, sensor azimuth evidence, weapon distance evidence, weapon pitching evidence and weapon azimuth evidence can also be formulated as -RH ; -RW ; -ML ; -MH and -MW , respectively.
For enemy target, by adopting the same method, the basic probability assignments of the sensor distance, sensor pitching evidence, sensor azimuth evidence, weapon distance evidence, weapon pitching evidence and weapon azimuth evidence can be formulated to be # RL ; # RH ; # RW ; # ML ; # MH and # MW , respectively.
Finally, we achieve the evidence synthesizing of the coordinated airfight.
It should be noted that the attacking effect will be different when the swarm of aircrafts employs different strategies (the allocations of a set of aircrafts versus a number of foe's targets) to attack foe's group of targets although the positions between any of aircrafts and each foe's target are the same.
Therefore, in this paper, the situational assessment is equivalent to calculating the validityai ðaÞ, invalidityai ðbÞ and uncertaintyai ðhÞ of the certain-strategy a i , as well as the validity # b j ðaÞ, invalidity # b j ðbÞ and uncertainty # b j ðhÞ of the foe's certain-strategy b j .
Our certain-strategy may consist of three cases:
(1) One of aircrafts attacks one of given foe's target.
(2) A set of aircrafts attack cooperatively the given foe's target. (3) None of aircrafts attacks the given foe's target.
The foe's certain-strategy is similar to our certain strategy. The validity of the fighting effect of k aircrafts cooperative attacking l targets may be acquired by a set of evidence synthesizing processes based on the evidence theory as follows:
where t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; l is the serial number of the certain foe's target meeting with attack; p n ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ; k is the serial number of those aircrafts attending the action; n ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ; k Mission decision-making method of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic frameworkdenotes the number of aircrafts attending the action of cooperative attack against the certain foe's target.
Eq. (4) denotes that the total fighting effect (including validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of the sensor on the aircraft with the serial number p n in the subscript ofai Rtp n is acquired by synthesizing the fighting effect of the sensor distance evidencesai RLtp n , the fighting effect of the sensor pitching evidencesai RHtp n , and the fighting effect of the sensor azimuth evidencesai RWtp n based on the D-S synthesize rules in Section 2.1 when one of our certain aircraft p n attacks one of foe's certain target t according to our certain strategy a i .
The meaning of Eq. (5) is similar to that of Eq. (4). The difference only lies in the fact that the weapon is described instead of the sensor.
Eq. (6) denotes that the total fighting effect (including validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of one of the aircrafts with the serial number p n (-
) is acquired by synthesizing the total fighting effect of the sensor evidencesai Rtp n and the total fighting effect of the weapon evidencesai Mtp n based on the D-S synthesize rules in Section 2.1 when one of our certain aircrafts p n attacks one of foe's certain target t according to the certain strategy a i .
Eq. (7) denotes that the total fighting effect (including validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of n our aircrafts with the serial number ðp 1 ; p 2 ; . . . ; p n Þ -ai t is acquired by synthesizing the total fighting effects of all our aircraft with the serial number ðp 1 ; p 2 ; . . . ; p n Þ cooperatively attacking the same foe's target t ð-
Þ based on the D-S synthesize rules in Section 2.1 when multiple aircrafts cooperatively attack one certain foe's target according to our certain strategy a i .
Considering the case that none of our aircraft attacks the given foe's target, we form a special rule as follows:
Eq. (8) denotes that the total fighting effect (validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of the aircraft team is set to be 0.299, 0.689 and 0.012 respectively, when none of our aircraft attack the certain foe's target t according to our certain strategy a i .
Eq. (9) denotes that the total fighting effect (including validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of the whole of our aircraft teamai is acquired by synthesizing the fighting effect of all aircrafts cooperatively attacking all l foe's targets with the serial number ð1; 2; . . . ; t; . . . ; lÞ - For enemy target, by adopting the same method, the total fighting effect (including validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of the whole of foe's target group # b j may be also acquired when multiple foe's targets cooperatively defend our multiple aircrafts according to the certain foe's strategy b j .
Formulating mission decision-making based on game theory
For achieving mission decision-making of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target, the relevant mathematical model is established based on the game theory as follows:
The game model is set as
where N is the game members, S 1 our strategy set, and S 2 the foe's strategy set. n 1 represents our team that consists of k aircrafts and n 2 represents the foe's group that consists of l targets:
. . . ; w k ; £g and we have
where
where a i ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; mÞ represents the m strategies of our k aircrafts cooperatively attacking l foe's targets, while b j ðj ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ the n strategies of l foe's targets cooperatively defending our k aircrafts. One among the parameters (d 1 ; d 2 ; . . . ; d l ) represents the serial number of l foe's targets; one among the parameters (w 1 ; w 2 ; . . . ; w k ) represents the serial number of our k aircrafts; £ represents nobody; ðW t ; d t Þ ðt ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; lÞ represents a set of our aircrafts marked by W t cooperatively attacking the same foe's target marked by d t , while ðD t ; w t Þ ðt ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; kÞ represents a number of foe's targets marked by D t cooperatively defending our same aircraft marked by w t .
When our strategy of a i and foe's strategy of b j are selected simultaneously, our payment function is set as
Similarly, the foe's payment function is set as
A ¼ ½ a ij mÂ n and B ¼ ½ b ij mÂ n are called our payment matrix and the foe's payment matrix, respectively.
The Nash equilibrium state of the game model G may be acquired by the certain computing method based on the matrix A and B.
Our strategy of a i and foe's strategy of b j denoted by the Nash equilibrium state will be used to determine the fighting action of our aircrafts team and guess the defending action of foe's targets group, respectively.
Simulation
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed methods, the following part presents the simulation results by using the mission decision-making algorithms in Sections 2 and 3.
Scenario
As shown in Fig. 2 , a typical scenario is simulated with our software to evaluate the performance of the proposed mission decision-making algorithm for multi-aircraft cooperative attack.
In
In our team, each UCAV has the same sensor detecting and weapon attacking ability, the flight altitude of 8000-11000 m (the value is 10000 m for this example) and the flight velocity of 200-280 m/s (the value is 240 m/s for this example). The four UCAVs take the form of trapezium (see Fig. 2 ). In the trapezium team, the distance between the frontal two UCAVs is 5-20 km (the value is 5 km for this example) and the distance between the latter two UCAVs is 10-50 km (the value is 10 km for this example); the distance between the frontal two UCAVs and the latter two UCAVs is 2.5-30 km (the value is 2.5 km for this example).
In enemy group, the three missile positions take the form of equilateral triangle (see Fig. 2 ). In the equilateral triangle team, the distance between any two missile positions is 10-30 km (the value is 10 km for this example) and the crucial target is located on the center of equilateral triangle. The distance between the center of our team and the center of enemy group is a variable that may be a value from 5 km to 70 km (the value is 10 km for this example).
The fighting ability of our UCAV depends on the suppositional sensor (SAR radar) and weapon (JDAM bomb). The ability of enemy missile position is restricted to the suppositional sensor (track homing radar) and weapon (short ground to air missile).
Game model
The mathematical model used for developing simulation software package is established based on the scenario in Section 4.1 and the algorithm designed in Section 3 as follows:
n 2 g n 1 represents our team consisting of four UCAVs and n 2 represents enemy group consisting of three missile positions and a crucial target. S 1 ¼ fa 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a 12 g represents the primary strategy set of our four UCAVs cooperatively attacking four foe's targets (compared with other strategies, these strategies are employed with higher probability of over 50%), where 
where w i ði ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4Þ represent the four UCAVs in our team, and d j ðj ¼ 1; 2; 3Þ represent the missile positions in the foe's team; m 4 represents a foe's crucial target. The term fðx; yÞ; zg represents that x and y attack cooperatively z, and ð£; m 4 Þ represents none of our aircrafts attack the foe's target m 4 . The meaning of the strategy a i ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 12Þ is explained by describing the strategy a 4 as follows: a 4 represents that our UCAV w 1 attacks foe's missile position d 1 , our two UCAVs w 2 and w 3 attack cooperatively foe's missile position d 2 , our UCAV w 4 attacks foe's crucial target m 4 , and none of our aircraft attack foe's missile position d 3 .
The character of the strategies a 1 À a 5 is that foe's missile positions and crucial target are attacked comparably, while the character of the strategies a 6 À a 12 is that the action of attacking foe's missile positions is prior to the action of attacking foe's crucial target.
S 2 ¼ fb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b 6 g represents the primary strategy set of four foe's targets cooperatively defending our four UCAVs (compared with other strategies, these strategies are employed with higher probability of over 50%), where Mission decision-making method of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic framework
The meaning of the strategy b j ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 6Þ can be explained similarly according to the meaning of the strategy a i ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 12Þ.
When our strategy a i and foe's strategy b j are selected simultaneously, our payment function is set as
. . . ; 12; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 6
Similarly, the foe's payment function is set as follows:
Actually, Eqs. (12) and (13) are embodiment of Eqs. (10) and (11) after our strategies a i and foe's strategies b j are confirmed.
Results
The simulation examples consist of a set of computing processes as follows:
Firstly, when a i and b j mentioned in Section 4.2 are selected simultaneously, the actual capability of the suppositional sensor (SAR radar) and weapon (JDAM bomb) aboard the UCAV and the suppositional sensor (track homing radar) and weapon (short ground to air missile) in the missile position mentioned in Section 4.1 may be transformed respectively into the unitary fighting effect values (- Secondly, the total fighting effect (including validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of the whole of our aircrafts team -ai ðÁÞ and the total fighting effect of the whole of foe's target group # b j ðÁÞ, mentioned in Eqs. (12) and (13) in Section 4.2, can be acquired by a set of computing processes based on the algorithms designed in Section 2 and the unitary fighting effect values acquired by the above computing.
As a result, our payment matrix A ¼ ½ a ij mÂn and foe's payment matrix B ¼ ½ b ij mÂ n mentioned in Section 3 can be acquired by computing Eqs. (12) and (13) and shown as follows:
Finally, the Nash equilibrium state of the game model G mentioned in Section 4.2 may be acquired by solving the matrix A and B based on the Scarf arithmetic in the Gambit software package.
In the situation of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target enacted in Section 4.1, the Nash equilibrium state of the game model G is that our strategy a 4 and foe's strategy b 4 are selected simultaneously.
Our strategy of a 4 and foe's strategy of b 4 will be regarded as the mission decision-making of our team antagonizing foe's group (Fig. 3) and will be used to determine the fighting action of our aircraft team and to guess the defending action of foe's target group, respectively.
Analysis
For validating the rationality of the studying results in Section 4, on the one hand, the other two strategies a 5 and a 6 are selected to antagonize foe's strategy b 4 , because the fighting effect difference between the two strategies and strategy a 4 is the least (Figs. 4 and 5) ; on the other hand, the other two strategies b 2 and b 6 are selected to antagonize our strategy a 4 , because the fighting effect difference between the two strategies and strategy b 4 is the least (Figs. 6 and 7) .
The results of comparing the fighting effect of our strategies (a 4 ; a 5 and a 6 ) and the fighting effect of foe's strategy b 4 are shown in Table 1 , while the results of comparing the fighting effect of foe's strategies (b 2 ; b 4 and b 6 ) and the fighting effect of our strategy a 4 are shown in Table 2 . Table 1 indicates that the fighting effects (validity) of our strategies a 4 ; a 5 and a 6 area 4 ðaÞ ¼ 0:988; -a 5 ðaÞ ¼ 0:947 and -a 6 ðaÞ ¼ 0:940, respectively. As a result, it can be explained why our strategy a 4 is regarded as the fighting action that our aircraft team should carry out when our team is antagonizing foe's group in the case described in Section 4.1.
Similarly, Table 2 467, respectively. As a result, it can also be explained why foe's strategy b 4 is regarded as the defending action that foe's target group may carry out in the same case.
To further evaluate the results of the proposed mission decision-making method in Section 4.3, we study the situation analyzing process of our equilibrium strategy a 4 in comparison with the strategy a 5 . Tables 3 and 4 list the fighting effect values which are obtained by using Eqs. (6)- (9) in Section 2.
According to the description in Section 4.3, the equilibrium results of the game model depend on our payment matrix A and the foe's payment matrix B. Each element in the payment matrix A and matrix B can be computed by the payment (12) and (13) mainly determine that our equilibrium strategy a 4 has better results than the strategy a 5 . Table 3 presents the obtaining process of the itemsa 4 ðaÞ anda 4 ðbÞ, which shows the quantitative analysis and computing process of the combat situation that our multiple aircrafts cooperatively attack multi-object with strategy a 4 . Similarly, Table 4 presents the obtaining process of the itemsa 5 ðaÞ anda 5 ðbÞ, which shows the quantitative analysis and computing process of the combat situation that our multiple aircrafts cooperatively attack multi-object with strategy a 5 .
In the following part, the numerical results in Tables 3 and  4 are analyzed to obtain the underlying reason why strategy a 4 has better results than strategy a 5 .
Comparing the data in Tables 3 and 4 In light of the above reasons (1) and (2), the fighting effect valuea 4 ðaÞ (0.988) with strategy a 4 is larger than the fighting effect valuea 5 ðaÞ (0.947) with strategy a 5 . In strategy a 5 , why does the fighting effect value decrease when our aircraft 1 is added to attack foe's missile position 2? In Table 4 , it can be found that the fighting effect value -a 5 21 ðaÞ is 0.241 when our aircraft 1 is deployed to attack foe's missile position 2. In other words, the effectiveness turns bad when our aircraft 1 is added to attack foe's missile position 2, which has a negative impact on the original strategy of our aircraft 2 and aircraft 3 cooperatively attacking foe's missile position 2. Therefore, the overall fighting effect value against foe's missile position 2 decreases when our aircraft 1 is added. It also demonstrates that ''more is not necessarily better".
In the scenario of Section 4.1, the horizontal distance between our aircraft 1 and the foe's missile position 2 is 4582 m. The pitch angle and azimuth angle are 65.8°and 57.3°, respectively.
To analyze the essential reason why our aircraft 1 should not be deployed to attack foe's missile position 2, the situation analysis is performed according to Eqs. (4)- (6) . The detailed results are listed in Table 5 . According to the effective range and angle of the sensor (SAR radar) and weapon (JDAM bomb), the horizontal distance between our aircraft 1 and foe's missile position 2 is proper, which supports the attack missions. In Table 5 , it can be found that both the fighting effect value with the sensor - The azimuth angle between our aircraft 1 and foe's missile position 2 (57.3°> 45°) has a large difference with the desired direction. Because the lateral detection is the main direction for the sensor (SAR radar), a large azimuth angle is near the main detection direction, which can improve the sensor performance and better support the attack mission. In Table 5 , it can be found that the fighting effect value with the sensor azimuth anglea 5 RW 21 ðaÞ (0.744) is larger than 0.5. The weapon (JDAM bomb) is the unpowered gliding weapon, and therefore, the yaw control of the weapon cannot be performed before its landing if the azimuth angle is too large at some given altitude (i.e., given gliding time). The hit probability may also decrease, which cannot support the attack mission. ðaÞ (0.100) is smaller than 0.5. The pitch angle (65.8°> 45°) between our aircraft 1 and foe's missile position 2 has a large overlook range. The offset of the sensor (SAR radar) antenna depends on the inner state of aircraft and has a limited range. Therefore, it is hard to achieve a large pitch angle, which blocks the performance of the sensor and the attack mission. In Table 5 , it can be found that the fighting effect value with the sensor pitch angle -a 5 RH 21 ðaÞ (0.100) is smaller than 0.5. The weapon (JDAM bomb) is the unpowered gliding weapon, and therefore, the flight path must be adjusted if the relative pitch angle is too large at some given altitude (i.e., given gliding time). Otherwise, the weapon cannot hit the target and support the attack mission before its landing. ðaÞ ¼ 0:152). Under the condition that both the sensor and weapon evidences do not support the attack mission, it is easy to conclude that, in the air combat scenario, our aircraft 1 should not be deployed to attack foe's missile position 2.
Conclusions
By using the above numerical simulations, the proposed mission decision-making method of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-object based on situation analysis can be concluded as follows:
(1) The general rule of the real combat process can be demonstrated on the basis of the equilibrium results, which are obtained by selecting the horizontal distance, pitch angle, and azimuth angle between our aircraft and foe's target, determining the fighting effect values of the sensor and weapon, and performing the quantitative analysis of the combat situation that our multiple aircrafts cooperatively attack multi-object by D-S evidence theory. (2) Based on the complete information static game theory, the mission decision-making model of the multiaircraft cooperatively attacking multi-object is established. The payment function can also be constructed, which realizes the parameter transfer between the quantitative analysis of air combat situation and optimal mission decision-making. The equilibrium results of the game model are computed by using the static dual matrix game algorithm. The air combat strategy can be determined by the Nash equilibrium solution which reflects the real air combat situation and antagonizing ability between two sides.
